

# Safe Policy Learning through Extrapolation

## Application to Pre-trial Risk Assessment

Eli Ben-Michael

Harvard University


(joint work with Kosuke Imai, Jim Greiner, and Zhichao Jiang)

Berkeley Machine Learning and Science Forum  
December 2021

Rule-based policies – i.e. algorithms – show up everywhere

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
*Panel A: 1968 Head Start funding per 4 year old*




[Ludwig and Miller, 2007]

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


[Ludwig and Miller, 2007]



[Morse, 2019]

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


[Dell and Querubin, 2018]

# Rule-based policies – i.e. algorithms – show up everywhere

Algorithmic policies are in many organizational levels

- Guiding high-level policies
- Aiding human decision makers with discretion



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
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
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
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[Dell and Querubin, 2018]

But how can we **improve** the underlying rules and algorithms?

# Goals and contributions

We know how to evaluate local effects of deterministic rules (e.g. RDD)

- To learn new rules we need to extrapolate from the existing status quo rule
- In some special cases we can extrapolate uniquely [Angrist and Rokkanen, 2015; Cattaneo et al., 2020]
- In general there are many ways to extrapolate from one dataset, so need to be careful!  
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*This paper:* a **safe extrapolation** approach to learning rule-based policies

- Characterize **all of the ways to extrapolate** under assumptions on the model
- Then find the **best policy in the worst case**
- Guaranteed to be at least as good as the status quo in terms of average utility
- Incorporates uncertainty from both extrapolation and noise

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Apply this methodology to pre-trial risk assessment algorithms

- Robust algorithms learn to classify fewer arrestees as risky

# Outline

1. Background on pre-trial risk assessment algorithms
2. Methodological framework for learning new rule-based policies
3. Results when applied to pre-trial risk assessment

# Pre-Trial Risk Assessment

## First appearance hearings

- Judge decides pre-trial release conditions
- Cash bail? How much? Monitoring?
- Short, many in one day



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## Assessment scores designed to help judges



# The PSA-DMF System

Public Safety Assessment (PSA) classifies 3 risks

1. Failure To Appear in court (FTA)
2. New Criminal Activity (NCA)
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Millions of people across 19 states live in jurisdictions that use the PSA-DMF system

Two goals: minimize pre-trial detention **and** NVCAs

- Ideally, no detentions and no NVCAs
- The amount of weight we apply to these two goals will be important
- This is different from predicting NVCAs well

Name: [REDACTED]

Spillman Name Number: [REDACTED]

DOB: [REDACTED]

Gender: Male

Arrest Date: 03/25/2017

PSA Completion Date: 03/27/2017

**New Violent Criminal Activity Flag**

No

**New Criminal Activity Scale**

1	2	3	4	5	6
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**Failure to Appear Scale**

1	2	3	4	5	6
---	---	---	---	---	---

**Charge(s):**

961.41(1)(D)(1) MFC DELIVER HEROIN <3 GMS F 3

**Risk Factors:**

**Responses:**

1. Age at Current Arrest	23 or Older
2. Current Violent Offense	No
a. Current Violent Offense & 20 Years Old or Younger	No
3. Pending Charge at the Time of the Offense	No
4. Prior Misdemeanor Conviction	Yes
5. Prior Felony Conviction	Yes
a. Prior Conviction	Yes
6. Prior Violent Conviction	2
7. Prior Failure to Appear Pretrial in Past 2 Years	0
8. Prior Failure to Appear Pretrial Older than 2 Years	Yes
9. Prior Sentence to Incarceration	Yes


**Recommendations:**

**Release Recommendation** - Signature bond

**Conditions** - Report to and comply with pretrial supervision


New Violent Criminal Arrest: Points		
PSA FACTOR	RESPONSE	POINTS
Current violent offense	No	0
	Yes	2
Current violent offense and 20 years old or younger	No	0
	Yes	1
Pending charge at the time of arrest	No	0
	Yes	1
Prior conviction (misdemeanor or felony)	No	0
	Yes	1
Prior violent conviction	No	0
	Yes, 1 or 2	1
	Yes, 3 or more	2

We want to change the NVCA threshold **and** how points are assigned






Also want to change the boundary for the cash bail recommendation



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# A randomized control trial evaluating pre-trial risk assessment

Ideal randomized experiment: randomize the algorithm's output

- Randomly flag arrestees as NVCA risk and randomly recommend cash bail
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[Greiner et al., 2020; Imai et al., 2020]

- 1891 arrests in Dane County, WI 2017-2019, 2-year-follow-up for half the sample
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Name: _____ BSN: _____ Date: _____ New York Institute of Technology New York, NY 10010	Institution Name: _____ Semester: _____ Date: _____ NYS Examination Date: 10/11/2014
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New York Institute of Technology Activity Log									
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1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Chapter: _____ Multiple Choice/True/False/Short Answer/Long Answer/Other
---

Test Items	Answers
1. Age of consent statute	17 or 18
2. Contract Valid Offense	No
3. Capacity of minor is 21 for most purposes	No
4. Assault charge is not a crime of the offense	No
5. Rape of a minor is a crime of the offense	No
6. Rape of a minor is a crime of the offense	No
7. Rape of a minor is a crime of the offense	No
8. Rape of a minor is a crime of the offense	No
9. Rape of a minor is a crime of the offense	No
10. Rape of a minor is a crime of the offense	No

Reason for non-compliance: _____ Signature of Student: _____ Signature of Parent: _____ Signature of Teacher: _____ Signature of Principal: _____ Signature of Superintendent: _____ Signature of State Education Commissioner: _____
---

[illegible]

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
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
Name: _____	Signature: _____			
BIO: _____	Grade: _____			
Period: _____	Date: _____			
_____	PBA Completion Date: 10/11/2013			
New Criminal/Deviant Activity Log				
Was Criminal/Deviant Activity Reported?				
Yes	1	2	3	4
No	5	6	7	8
Refused to Appear Before _____				
Yes	1	2	3	4
No	5	6	7	8
Discipline				
MILITARY DISCIPLINE (MILITARY DISCIPLINE) (MILITARY DISCIPLINE)				
Add Details				
1. Age at Arrest/Admission	Age _____			
2. Current Violation Offense	Offense _____			
3. Current Violation Sentence	Sentence _____			
4. Current Violation Sentence & 2010 Federal Law Reference	Sentence _____			
5. Arresting Charge at the Time of the Offense	Charge _____			
6. Prior Misconduct	Misconduct _____			
7. Prior Conviction	Conviction _____			
8. Prior Commitment	Commitment _____			
9. Prior Commitment	Commitment _____			
10. Prior Commitment	Commitment _____			
11. Prior Failure to Appear Pending in Past 2 Years	Failure _____			
12. Prior Failure to Appear Pending More Than 2 Years	Failure _____			
13. Prior Sentences to Inmate	Inmate _____			
14. Prior Sentences to Inmate	Inmate _____			
Recommendation				
Recommendation - _____				
Additional Comments - _____				


Name: <u>[REDACTED]</u>	Spillsheet Name: <u>Worksheet 1</u>																										
Gender: <u>Male</u>																											
DOB: <u>[REDACTED]</u>	MSL (Date of completion): <u>03/03/2020</u>																										
Name and address of Clinical/Referring Agency:																											
- Nil																											
Date Completed: <u>03/03/2020</u>																											
<table border="1"> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>2</td> <td>3</td> <td>4</td> <td>5</td> <td>6</td> </tr> </table>	1	2	3	4	5	6																					
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Failure to Report Details:																											
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<del> <p>MSL (Spill) MFLC Incident: <u>03/03/2020</u> TIME: <u>7.3</u></p> <p>MSL System:</p> <table border="1"> <tr> <th></th> <th>Response:</th> </tr> <tr> <td>1. Alert to Incident</td> <td>OK (✓/X)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2. Current Vessel Offshore</td> <td>Yes</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3. Current Vessel Distance to 20 NM from shore</td> <td>Yes</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4. Handling Change of the Time at the Offshore</td> <td>Yes</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5. Prior (Offshore) Incident</td> <td>Yes</td> </tr> <tr> <td>6. Prior Vessel Condition</td> <td>Yes</td> </tr> <tr> <td>7. Prior Vessel Condition</td> <td>Yes</td> </tr> <tr> <td>8. Prior Pollution to the Environment</td> <td>Yes</td> </tr> <tr> <td>9. Prior Pollution to the Environment</td> <td>Yes</td> </tr> <tr> <td>10. Prior Pollution to the Environment</td> <td>Yes</td> </tr> <tr> <td>11. Prior Pollution to the Environment</td> <td>Yes</td> </tr> <tr> <td>12. Prior Pollution to the Environment</td> <td>Yes</td> </tr> </table> </del>			Response:	1. Alert to Incident	OK (✓/X)	2. Current Vessel Offshore	Yes	3. Current Vessel Distance to 20 NM from shore	Yes	4. Handling Change of the Time at the Offshore	Yes	5. Prior (Offshore) Incident	Yes	6. Prior Vessel Condition	Yes	7. Prior Vessel Condition	Yes	8. Prior Pollution to the Environment	Yes	9. Prior Pollution to the Environment	Yes	10. Prior Pollution to the Environment	Yes	11. Prior Pollution to the Environment	Yes	12. Prior Pollution to the Environment	Yes
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
We'll use this data to **learn a better algorithm**, rather than evaluate the existing one















# Suggestive but inconclusive evidence that PSA content has effects




# Safe Policy Learning




















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# Setup

For each individual  $i$ , observe

- Covariates  $X_i \in \mathcal{X}$  e.g. pre-computed risk scores or criminal history
- Action taken  $A_i \in \mathcal{A} = \{0, 1\}$  e.g. trigger NVCA flag or recommend cash bail
- Binary outcome  $Y_i \in \{0, 1\}$  no NVCA occurring

**Deterministic** status quo policy  $\tilde{\pi}$ , where  $A_i = \tilde{\pi}(X_i)$

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Observed outcomes are

$$Y_i = \begin{cases} Y_i(0), & \tilde{\pi}(X_i) = 0 \\ Y_i(1), & \tilde{\pi}(X_i) = 1 \end{cases}$$

	$\tilde{\pi}(X_i) = 0$	$\tilde{\pi}(X_i) = 1$
$Y_i(0)$	$Y_i$	?
$Y_i(1)$	?	$Y_i$

To find the optimal algorithmic policy, we need counterfactual information

Our goal: Find a policy with high **expected utility** (value/welfare)

$$V(\pi, m) = \mathbb{E}[\text{benefit} \times m(\pi(X), X) - \text{cost} \times \pi(X)]$$

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- *In the paper*: include Judge's decisions into utility

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Deterministic policies  $\longrightarrow$  many ways to extrapolate and impute the counterfactual

Rather than choose one particular imputation, optimize for the worst case

We **partially identify** the model  $m \in \mathcal{M}$ , then find the best policy in the worst case

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- A robust optimization approach [Bertsimas et al., 2011; Kallus and Zhou, 2021; Pu and Zhang, 2021]
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Many model assumptions result in point-wise bounds


$$B_\ell(a, x) \leq m(a, x) \leq B_u(a, x)$$

- Lipschitz functions, additive models, linear models
- Similar assumptions on outcomes as RD, but globally

Easy to compute!

- Plug in the worst-case bound [Pu and Zhang, 2021]

$$\min_{m \in \mathcal{M}} V(\pi, m) = V(\pi, B_\ell)$$






This is a **safe** policy that is at least as good as the **status quo** on average

The value of  $\pi^{\text{inf}}$  is at least as high as the **status quo**


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
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
Allows policy makers to know things won't get worse

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- Conservative, "pessimistic" principle [Cui, 2021]

Many other possible objectives in this framework

[Manski, 2005]


- Possibly also ensure safety for subgroups individually



The **safe** policy is sub-optimal, but we can bound how much

Compare to the **best possible** policy

$$\pi^* \in \operatorname{argmax}_{\pi \in \Pi} V(\pi)$$



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
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Optimality gap controlled by size of  $\mathcal{M}$

$$V(\pi^*) - V(\pi^{\text{inf}}) \leq u \mathbb{E} \left[ \max_{a \in \mathcal{A}} B_u(a, X) - B_\ell(a, X) \right]$$

- Tighter **partial identification**  $\rightarrow$  better policy
- If we can extrapolate uniquely,  $\pi^{\text{inf}}$  is also optimal



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
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
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
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





To find the **safe policy** empirically from data, we need to account for noise




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
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
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
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
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




To find the **safe policy** empirically from data, we need to account for noise

Construct a  $1 - \alpha$  confidence set  $\widehat{\mathcal{M}}_n(\alpha)$

$$P\left(\mathcal{M} \in \widehat{\mathcal{M}}_n(\alpha)\right) \geq 1 - \alpha$$




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
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Empirical welfare maximization problem with imputed counterfactuals  $\widehat{\Upsilon}_i(a)$

$$\hat{\pi} \in \operatorname{argmax}_{\pi \in \Pi} \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \text{benefit} \times \widehat{\Upsilon}_i(\pi(X_i)) - \text{cost} \times \pi(X_i)$$



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Gives a **statistical safety** guarantee

- Approximately holds with prob.  $\geq 1 - \alpha$
- Tradeoff between level  $\alpha$  and tighter bounds

Learning a new PSA-DMF system


## Learning a new NVCA Flag: choosing the algorithm

Construct a new NVCA flag using the same risk factors and structure

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
- Change the threshold but keep the number of points assigned to each factor fixed



# Learning a new NVCA Flag: choosing the algorithm

Construct a new NVCA flag using the same risk factors and structure

- Change the threshold but keep the number of points assigned to each factor fixed
- Change the number of points assigned to each factor but keep the threshold fixed



New Violent Criminal Arrest: Points		
PSA FACTOR	RESPONSE	POINTS
Current violent offense	No	0
	Yes	2
Current violent offense and 20 years old or younger	No	0
	Yes	1
Pending charge at the time of arrest	No	0
	Yes	1
Prior conviction (misdemeanor or felony)	No	0
	Yes	1
Prior violent conviction	No	0
	Yes, 1 or 2	1
	Yes, 3 or more	2

# How do we weigh the costs of flagging arrestees vs an NVCA?

Define utility based on triggering the flag and whether NVCA occurs

- Monetary cost of triggering the flag is zero
- But fiscal costs on jurisdiction and social and economic costs on individual and community
- Presumption of innocence, so limit pre-trial detention



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
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Use a single parameterization:


$$\text{NVCA Cost} \times Y(a) - \pi(a)$$

- Pin fiscal and societal costs to be 1
- Cost of an NVCA starts at 1 and grows


# Robust approach raises the NVCA risk threshold




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
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


Robust approach places less weight on violent convictions and triggers flag less




$$\text{Effect} = f_1(\text{current violent offense}) + f_2(\text{prior violent convictions}) + \dots$$

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Effect =  $f_1(\text{current violent offense}) + f_2(\text{prior violent convictions}) + \dots$


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Effect =  $f_1$ (current violent offense) +  $f_2$ (prior violent convictions) + ...




With an additive model we can identify a slice of the DMF matrix...




$$\text{Effect} = f_1(\text{FTA Score}) + f_2(\text{NCA Score})$$

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
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


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
...but we can't reliably learn a new algorithm when accounting for statistical noise




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## Recap: Safe policy learning through extrapolation

Deterministic rule-based and algorithmic policies are everywhere

- Generate a lot of data! But deterministic nature means we have to extrapolate



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This paper: Extrapolate in a **safe** way with robust optimization to learn a new algorithm

- Characterize **all of the ways to extrapolate** and find the **best policy in the worst case**
- Gives a **statistical safety** guarantee: at least as good as the status quo
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Many more questions on designing algorithms to assist human decision makers


- Asymmetric utility functions lead to **unidentifiable** objectives
- Incorporating fairness and alternative notions of "safety"
- Optimizing for long term outcomes when we only can measure short term outcomes
- Learning policies when human decisions mediate future outcomes and decisions

# Thank you!


[ebenmichael.github.io](https://ebenmichael.github.io)

# Appendix


# Cash Bail and NVCAs are less common




# Frequency of attributes entering the NVCA Flag



## FTA and NCA scores move in unison




# Additive treatment effects are at the sweetspot of robustness and optimality





Robust approach changes scores to trigger NVCA flag less often



$$\text{Effect} = f_1(\text{current violent offense}) + f_2(\text{prior violent convictions}) + \dots$$

# Incorporating experiments and human decisions

## Incorporating experiments evaluating a deterministic policy

- In our study, judges randomly receive the “null policy”  $\emptyset$ , no access to PSA

Allows us to work with **treatment effects** instead of outcomes

$$\tau(a, x) = \mathbb{E}[Y(a) - Y(\emptyset) \mid X = x]$$

- Treatment effects are often considered to be simpler than baseline outcomes

[Künzel et al., 2019; Hahn et al., 2020; Nie and Wager, 2021]

## Incorporating judge decisions from algorithmic recommendations

- Define utility based on potential decision  $D(a)$  and potential outcome  $Y(D(a))$

$$\text{benefit} \times Y(D(a)) - \text{cost} \times D(a)$$

Value includes two **unidentified** components, outcomes **and decisions**

- Need to find the worst case potential decision and outcome for cost and benefit

# Statistical properties

Value is probably, approximately at least as high as **baseline**

$$V(\tilde{\pi}) - V(\hat{\pi}) \lesssim \text{Complexity}(\Pi) \quad \text{with probability at least } \gtrsim 1 - \alpha$$

- Conservative approach gives a **statistical safety** guarantee with level  $\alpha$
- If policy class  $\Pi$  is complex, need more samples to avoid overfitting

Empirical optimality gap controlled by size of  $\widehat{\mathcal{M}}_n(\alpha)$  and complexity of  $\Pi$

$$V(\pi^*) - V(\hat{\pi}) \lesssim \frac{u}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \max_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \widehat{B}_{\alpha u}(a, X_i) - \widehat{B}_{\alpha \ell}(a, X_i) + \text{Complexity}(\Pi)$$

with probability at least  $\gtrsim 1 - \alpha$

- Tradeoff between safety and optimality

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